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January 23, 2008 In October last year, Toronto Star columnist Thomas Walkom wrote that the members of Harper's handpicked Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan proved that the war is not about Afghanistan, "It is about the U.S." Four of the five appointees, "have been intimately involved with the problems of Canada-U.S. relations, and in particular with the campaign to convince Americans that Canada is not soft on terror," he wrote. But with the release yesterday of the Panel's final report, it also became clear that its recommendations have little to do with convincing NATO that more troops are needed and everything to do with convincing Canadians that we should be in Afghanistan at all. The Panel has basically recommended an indefinite extension of Canada's counter-insurgency combat mission in Afghanistan in a war that has already taken the lives of 77 Canadian soldiers and, as noted in the report, cost $6.1 billion.
Photo: Manley gives Harper what he wants by recommending Canadian troops stay in Afghanistan indefinitely. Credit: Government of Canada website. In what appears to be a staged attempt to garner more public suport for continued military involvement in Afghanistan, Manley's report argues that Canada should only agree to extend its mission in Kandahar province if NATO agrees to supply at least 1,000 more troops to help fight the Taliban in that region. But as news reports this month show, the United States already plans on increasing its warfighting presence in the south by up to 3,000 troops. Major-General Lewis MacKenzie told the Globe and Mail today that if "no other NATO country fesses up, then the additional 3,200 [promised U.S.] marines of which 2,000 are available for combat operations coming to the south could be seen to be meeting Canada's requirement." Despite this apparent fait accompli, the Globe's editorial board still claims, quoting the Manley report, that securing a troop commitment will require "coherent and sustained diplomacy by Canada led by the Prime Minister and specifically including interventions on the subject in his bilateral conversations with foreign leaders." The Globe also writes that Manley et al's support for extending the mission, "undoubtedly is the conclusion Stephen Harper expected… when he appointed him to chair the panel, and it is the right one." Michael Byers, who turned down a position on the Manley panel, frames the situation perfectly, also in the Globe today, when he criticizes Manley for essentially repeating previously stated beliefs about the Afghanistan mission. "This is my principal problem with him being appointed as chair of the Afghanistan panel," wrote Byers. "He was so publicly on the record… and he quite clearly hasn't changed his mind one iota… It's like appointing a person to a jury in a criminal trial who has already expressed a clear opinion on the guilt or innocence of the accused party." Some highlights of the Manley report include: * "Afghanistan is at war, and Canadians are combatants. It is a war fought between an elected democratic government and a zealous insurgency of proven brutality." * "The financial cost of Canada's military engagement (totals) $6.1 billion from fiscal years 2000-01 to 2006-07." The Panel does not say how many billion dollars more need to be spent on war in Afghanistan or how many more lives their recommendations will cost, they only say, "Ending Canada's military contribution in Kandahar is… not a matter of setting artificial deadlines in time. It is a matter of making real progress in the context of events on the ground." * The report acknowledges various concerns we have raised, while still dismissing them as reasons to end Canada's military mission there. These include: a. "(Canadians) wonder what it's all for, whether success is achievable, and in the end, whether the results will justify the human and other costs." b. "Our assessment of the situation recognizes the enormity of the challenge: regional instability; slow progress on reconstruction and development; mounting insecurity and violence; corruption, criminality and increasing poppy production." c. "Both the reality and perception of corruption in the Government of Afghanistan must be rooted out." d. "It is natural for Canadians to reconsider the wisdom and rightness of Canada's involvement in a war that has been so difficult and inconclusive." e. "By many knowledgeable accounts, security generally has deteriorated in the South and East of Afghanistan, including Kandahar province where Canadian Forces are based, through 2006 and 2007." f. "The Panel could elicit no conclusive explanation for the disproportionately high casualty rates suffered by Canadians in Afghanistan. This issue warrants closer scrutiny by the Government." g. "No insurgency – and certainly not the Afghan insurgency – can be defeated by military force alone… It is essential to adjust funding and staffing imbalances between the heavy Canadian military commitment in Afghanistan and the comparatively lighter civilian commitment to reconstruction, development and governance." * The key recommendation from the Panel is that: "Canada should continue with its responsibility for security in Kandahar beyond February 2009, in a manner fully consistent with the UN mandate on Afghanistan, including its combat role, but with increasing emphasis on training the Afghan National Security Force expeditiously to take lead responsibility for security in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole. As the Afghan National Security Forces gain capability, Canada's combat role should be significantly reduced." The Panel concedes that, "There was no clear consensus among military officers or civilian experts as to when Afghan security forces will achieve sufficient size and competence for the withdrawal of ISAF forces in general, or from Kandahar in particular." That being said, some sources have suggested this task might take at least ten years or more to accomplish. In terms of the timing of the vote in the House of Commons on this mission, the Panel writes, "Parliament might wish to defer judgment on Canada's future in Afghanistan until the NATO summit (in early-April) is concluded." Despite the relatively short time frame of the April meeting, the Panel sets out a much longer decision-making period by saying, "If no undertakings on the battle group are received from ISAF partner countries by February 2009, or if the necessary equipment is not procured, the Government should give appropriate notice to the Afghan and allied governments of its intention to transfer responsibility for security in Kandahar." The Harper cabinet will meet in a special full-day session on Thursday, January 24 to consider this report. If your Member of Parliament is a minister in Harper's cabinet, be sure to contact them with your concerns about this report before the special cabinet meeting this Thursday. You can read more about the Council of Canadians position on the war in Afghanistan by clicking here.
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In the chair's foreword, John Manley writes, "I realize many Canadians are uneasy about Canada's mission in Afghanistan." In fact, the latest 
